The Florida Intrastate Transportation Alliance

Kozak v Hillsborough County Public Transportation Commission

Filed December 30, 2009

Notice that this is a pro se' filing. Tampa attorney's may contact Kozak through this website regarding assuming the case on contingency 

IN THE COUNTY COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY STATE OF FLORIDA

CIVIL DIVISION

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, WALTER KOZAK d/b/a Gunny’s Intrastate Travel and Tours with this Verified Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive Relief and Damages with a claim that Chapter 2001-299 Laws of Florida violates Article III, Section 11 (a)(20) of the Florida Constitution, agency rules of Defendant violates its enabling legislation and Ch 120 F.S. and that actions of Defendant under color of law has deprived Plaintiff of a fundamental liberty right to pursue a livelihood protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

I.  JURISDICTION

1.        This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief.

2.        This is an action related to local government regulations enumerated in a special law applied to individuals whose occupation is regulated by a Florida State Agency.

3.        The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to Chapter 86 et.seq., Florida Statutes which authorizes circuit courts to enter declaratory judgments.

4.        The jurisdiction of this Court is also invoked pursuant to Chapter 26.012(3), Florida Statutes which authorizes the circuit court to enter injunctions, and the inherent power of Florida courts to grant injunctive relief.

5.         The jurisdiction of this Court is also invoked pursuant to Article I, ‘ ‘ 2,9,10,12,17,23 and Article III ss 11 ( 20 ), of the Constitution of the State of Florida.

6.         The jurisdiction of this Court is also invoked pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ‘’ 1983. This is a cause of action also arising under the Constitution of the United States under the Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. 

II.  THE PARTIES

7.         Plaintiff, WALTER KOZAK, d/b/a Gunny’s Intrastate Travel and Tours a sole proprietorship (hereinafter, “Kozak” or “Plaintiffs”) with a mailing address of, XXXXXXXXX, Spring Hill, Hernando County, Florida 34608 is a Department of Transportation registered motor carrier (D.O.T. 1203095) engaged in the business of providing Florida Intrastate Passenger Transportation.

8.        Defendant, HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION, (hereinafter “PTC”) with office location at, 2007 W. Kennedy Blvd. Tampa, Florida  33606is an Independent Special District created by an act of the Florida Legislature, Chapter 2001-299 Laws of Florida (hereinafter “2001-299”), a special law of local application.

III.  GENERAL ALLEGATIONS  

a.  Motor Carriers regulated by a state agency, the Florida Department of Transportation, have been placed under the regulations of Defendant via a special law of local application

9.         Kozak is a motor carrier engaged in the business of providing intercounty passenger transportation utilizing vehicles designed to transport in excess of 10 passengers including the driver for compensation and are defined as buses under Ch 316.003(3) F.S.:

 (3)  BUS.--Any motor vehicle designed for carrying more than 10 passengers and used for the transportation of persons and any motor vehicle, other than a taxicab, designed and used for the transportation of persons for compensation. (emphasis supplied)

10.       Kozak operates a private business enterprise which is under no contractual agreement with any governmental agency and as such, his bus is classified under Ch. 316.003(78) F.S. as a NONPUBLIC SECTOR BUS:

(78)  NONPUBLIC SECTOR BUS.--Any bus which is used for the transportation of persons for compensation and which is not owned, leased, operated, or controlled by a municipal, county, or state government or a governmentally owned or managed nonprofit corporation. (emphasis supplied)

11.    The Florida Legislature through mandate of law has charged the Florida Department of Transportation (hereinafter “FDOT”) with regulating motor carriers utilizing nonpublic sector buses under Ch. 316.70(1) F.S.:

 (1)  The Department of Transportation shall establish and revise standards to assure the safe operation of nonpublic sector buses, as defined in s. 316.003(78), which standards shall be those contained in 49 C.F.R. parts 382, 385, and 390-397 and which shall be directed towards assuring that:

(a)  Nonpublic sector buses are safely maintained, equipped, and operated.

(b)  Nonpublic sector buses are carrying the insurance required by law and carrying liability insurance on the checked baggage of passengers not to exceed the standard adopted by the United States Department of Transportation.

(c) Florida license tags are purchased for nonpublic sector buses pursuant to s. 320.38.

(d)  The driving records of drivers of nonpublic sector buses are checked by their employers at least once each year to ascertain whether the driver has a suspended or revoked driver's license.

12.       Ch 316.70(2) F.S. also empowers the FDOT with authority to conduct compliance review inspections of Kozak’s operations as well as the levying of civil fines upon Kozak if found to be in violation of any regulations or orders of the FDOT:

(2)  Department of Transportation personnel may conduct compliance reviews for the purpose of determining compliance with this section. A civil penalty not to exceed $5,000 in the aggregate may be assessed against any person who violates any provision of this section or who violates any rule or order of the Department of Transportation. A civil penalty not to exceed $25,000 in the aggregate may be assessed for violations found in a follow up compliance review conducted within a 24-month period. A civil penalty not to exceed $25,000 in the aggregate may be assessed and the motor carrier may be enjoined pursuant to s. 316.3026 if violations are found after a second follow up compliance review within 12 months after the first follow up compliance review. Motor carriers found to be operating without insurance coverage required by s. 627.742 or 49 C.F.R. part 387 may be enjoined as provided in s. 3116.3026.  (emphasis supplied)

13.      Chapter 14-87.0011, .0012 and .002 Florida Administrative Code as amended 10-9-05 sets forth definitions, assessment of penalties and payment of penalties the FDOT may impose on nonpublic sector bus motor carriers.

14.      In addition  to ch 316.70 F.S. and amended rules under F.A.C. provided are various documentation establishing FDOT as the regulator of nonpublic sector buses including but not limited to; the FDOT Commercial Motor Vehicle Manual setting forth a variety of regulations applied to nonpublic sector bus motor carriers [pertinent part attached hereunto as “Exhibit 1”], Staff Analysis for amending section 316.70 declaring FDOT as the regulator of nonpublic sector buses [pertinent part attached hereunto as “Exhibit 2”] , and the July 2001 DOT Transportation Safety Planning report inclusion that FDOT’s Motor Carrier Compliance Division regulates nonpublic sector buses [pertinent part attached hereunto as “Exhibit 3”].   

15.       It is unequivocal that the regulation of motor carriers engaged in the occupation of providing nonpublic sector bus transportation falls under the FDOT, a State Agency.

16.       In its enactment of 2001-299, the Florida Legislature has mandated that the PTC regulate motor carriers utilizing vehicles defined as public vehicles under S-3(24):

(24) “Public vehicle” means a taxicab, van, limousine, handicab, basic life support ambulance, and wrecker.

17.       2001-299 S-3 (17) definition of limousine includes nonpublic sector buses:

(17)  “Limousine” means any motor vehicle for hire not equipped with a taximeter, with a capacity for 15 passengers or less, including the driver. (emphasis supplied)

18.       2001-299 S-3 (33) definition of van includes nonpublic sector buses:

(33) “Van” means any motor-driven vehicle with a capacity of 10 to 15 passengers, including the driver, for the transportation of for hire passengers, which operates within the county but does not include sight-seeing cars and buses, streetcars, motor buses operated pursuant to franchise or courtesy vans, and limousines not for hire. (emphasis supplied)

19.      The passenger capacity provisions contained in the definitions are disingenuous as the definition of “capacity” under 2001-299, S-3(4) is, “the maximum seating provided in a motor vehicle at the time of original manufacture.”  With virtually every larger passenger capacity vehicle in use by the passenger transport industry being that of what is known as “second stage manufacturing” whereas coachbuilders purchase units from original manufacturers such as Ford Motor Company and then fabricates the passenger compartments prior to being placed on the market for purchase by motor carriers, 2001-299 empowers the PTC to regulate passenger motor carriers utilizing vehicles with a capacity in excess of 15 passengers based on the vehicle capacity prior to the second stage manufacture.

20.       Predicated on the passenger capacity contained under 2001-299’s definitions of limousine and van, the Legislature has placed motor carriers who are regulated by the FDOT under the regulation of the PTC via a special law.

21.       Regardless of if loading passengers in Hillsborough for transport to another point in the state, transporting passengers into Hillsborough loaded at another point in the state or simply traversing through Hillsborough in intercounty transport from one county to another, pursuant to 2001-299 S-7 ( 1 ), Kozak is prohibited from traversing the roadways of Hillsborough County in any nonpublic sector bus which would fall under the broad definition of public vehicle as defined under 2001-299 S-3 (17) and (33) unless Kozak places his FDOT regulated nonpublic sector bus operations under the regulations of the PTC:

( 1 )  It is unlawful for any person to engage in the business of operating a public vehicle on the public highways of the county unless that person has complied with the provisions of this act and any rules adopted in accordance with this act.

22.      Article III, Section 11 ( a )( 20 ) of the Florida Constitution provides:

(a)  There shall be no special law or general law of local application pertaining to:

(20)  regulation of occupations which are regulated by a state agency

b.  PTC agency rule 1.15 and fees contained under appendix 1 exceeds  the PTC’s statutory rule making authority

23.       2001-299 S-5 sets forth mandatory and discretionary powers of the PTC as well as providing authority for agency rules that the PTC shall or may adopt.

24.       2001-299 S-5 (1)(b) mandates that the PTC shall, “adopt rules in conformance with chapter 120, Florida Statutes the Administrative Procedures Act” (hereinafter, “APA”) .

25.       Ch 120.52(8) F.S. sets forth that:

“an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority means action which goes beyond the powers, functions, and  duties delegated by the Legislature. A proposed or existing rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority if any of the following applies”:

(b)  The agency has exceeded its grant of rulemaking authority

(c)  The rule enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented

(d)  The rule is vague, fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions, or vests unbridled discretion in the agency;

(f)  The rule imposes regulatory costs on the regulated person, county, or city which could be reduced by the adoption of less costly alternatives that substantially accomplish the statutory objectives.

26.      The PTC has been charged by the Legislature with regulating public vehicles and the Legislature has defined public vehicles under 2001-299 S-3 (24):

27.       The Legislature includes a subcategory of vehicles defined as limousine under 2001-299 S-3 ( 17 ):

“Limousine” means any motor vehicle for hire not equipped with a taximeter, with a capacity for 15 passengers or less, including the driver. (emphasis supplied)

28.      Without any specific statutory authority to do such, the PTC has adopted into agency rule 1.15 a definition of limousine which significantly enlarges and modifies the Legislature’s definition:

“Limousine” means any motor vehicle for hire not equipped with a taximeter, with the capacity for 15 passengers or less, including the driver. This definition consists of vehicles which are recognized by the industry as “luxury” vehicles, that are considered as high-end luxury vehicles by the manufacturer and vehicles that have been uniquely modified so as to provide “luxury” limousine service. The “luxury” quality of vehicles will be determined by assessing aesthetics of the interior and exterior of the vehicle, amenities provided to the passenger, spaciousness and comparison to current industry standards for vehicles performing limousine service in Hillsborough County. Unless otherwise indicated, use of the word “limousine” within these Rules shall mean to include all varieties of limousines discussed in these rules, collectively. Limousines can be sub-categorized as follows:

a.  “Stretch Limousine” or a sedan/SUV model that was manufactured or remanufactured with an extended wheel base or;

b.   “Limousine Sedans” or luxury vehicles with space for at least two passengers behind the driver and additional space behind those passengers for luggage, or;

c.  “Sport Utility Vehicles” (SUV that are top-of-the-line models and have luxury package options included to provide luxury service, or;

d.  “Limousine Buses” that are used for passenger transport for-hire. These buses can have forward facing seating or can be modified for circular or “party” seating.  

The Director, subject to Commission review, may develop and update a list of vehicles which qualify as limousine Sedans and SUVs.

29.      In addition to a statutory requirement to adopt agency rules in conformance with the APA, the PTC as an administrative creature of the legislature possessing no constitutional powers is prohibited from enacting rules which modify law.

30.      Kozak also employs a 7 passenger minivan to facilitate intercounty transportation of passengers.

31.      Pursuant to 2001-299 S-7 (2), Kozak needs to obtain from the PTC a “certificate” and all associated licensing under 2001-299 to transport his Hernando County passengers in Hillsborough County with his 7 passenger minivan or be subject to arrest, criminal prosecution and seizure of vehicle:

“Any person desiring to engage in the business of operating any public vehicle in the county must first acquire a certificate from the commission and must first make written application to the commission on a form provided by the commission for that purpose……….”

32.      Even though the minivan falls within the legislative definition of public vehicle under the limousine category (see S-3, 17) and the PTC will use the statutory definition to enforce the provisions of 2001-299 upon Kozak, Kozak is prohibited from obtaining 2001-299’s mandated licensure for the minivan as this vehicle does not meet the “high-end, luxury” requirements set forth in the PTC’s modification and enlargement of the statutory definition of limousine through agency rule 1.15.

33.      The PTC, prohibiting Kozak from obtaining licensure for his fleet minivan predicated on agency rule 1.15 has severely restricted Kozak’s intercounty county passenger transportation business operations and growth opportunities which has resulted in personal and business economic damages.

34.      Under 2001-299 S-5, (2)(e) the PTC is empowered to adopt into agency rule, a fee schedule levied against motor carriers:

“By rule, establish a fee schedule to include annual fees for certificates, permits, and public vehicle driver’s licenses and charge fees as necessary to recover costs for the services rendered pursuant to this act and any rules adopted in accordance with this act.” (emphasis supplied)  

35.       Appendix 2 par.12 of PTC rules provides the, “each application shall be accompanied by an application fee which shall be non-refundable”.

36.      Fielding complaints from taxi drivers and local limousine operators regarding new market entrants (business competition), the commission board ordered the staff to seek avenues to toughen requirements for motor carriers seeking PTC certificates and vehicle permits in order to be in compliance with 2001-299.

37.      The PTC held a series of workshops and devised a drastic increase of application fees as a means to toughen application for a PTC certificate which raised the nonrefundable certificate application fees 900% from $500.00 to $5,000.00.

38.      In a transparent move conducive of the distain PTC Commissioners have shown intercounty motor carriers over the years, vehicle permit fees applied to intercounty motor carriers restricted to the interstate ports of entry (known as a restricted certificate) jumped from $150.00 to $500.00 in comparison to unrestricted vehicle permit fees which were raised from $290.00 to $350.00.

39.      A motor carrier operation such as Kozak’s which utilizes various size vehicles to accommodate different passenger and cargo loads requires obtaining two PTC certificates (limousine and van) and which requires a nonrefundable fee of $10,000.00 on a bet that the application will not be denied for any arbitrary reason by the Commissioners.

40.      Noted is that PTC licensure does not grant access to the primary interstate transportation hubs (Tampa International and Cruise Ship Terminals) as such are separate licensing requirements motor carrier must obtain from the respective terminals.    

41.      The PTC has an established decade old history of imposing unlawful rules upon the citizens as a matter of record ranging from the Staff Analysis (HB1629, 2000 session) creating 2001-299 [pertinent part attached hereunto as “Exhibit 4”] to more recently in 2009 with the Florida Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (JAPC) 2009 repeatedly demanding that the PTC bring its rules into compliance with the law [JAPC letters dated March 12, 2009, September 10, 2009 and November 16, 2009 attached hereunto as “Exhibit 5”, “Exhibit 6” and “Exhibit 7”]  .       

COUNT I

2001-299 S-3(17) placement of motor carriers regulated by the Florida Department of Transportation under the regulation of the PTC violates Article III, Section 11 (a)  (20) of the Florida Constitution

42.       Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs one ( 1 ) through forty one (41) above as if set forth fully herein.

43.       By placing motor carriers utilizing vehicles with a passenger capacity which qualifies the vehicle as a nonpublic sector bus pursuant to Ch 316.003(78) under the regulation of the PTC by defining the FDOT regulated nonpublic sector bus as a limousine pursuant 2001-299 S-3 (17), the Legislature has placed motor carriers regulated by the FDOT, a State Agency, under the regulatory umbrella of the PTC via a special law.

44.       Placement of a motor carrier occupation which is regulated by a State Agency under the regulatory umbrella of a local agency such as the PTC via a special law violates the provisions set forth under Article III, Section 11 ( a ) (20) of the Florida Constitution.

COUNT II

2001-299 S-3 (33) placement of motor carriers regulated by the Florida Department of Transportation under the regulation of the PTC violates Article III, Section 11 (a)  (20) of the Florida Constitution

45.       Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs one ( 1 ) through forty one (41) above as if set forth fully herein.

46.       By placing motor carriers utilizing vehicles with a passenger capacity which qualifies the vehicle as a nonpublic sector bus under Ch 316.003(78) under the regulation of the PTC through defining the FDOT regulated nonpublic sector bus a van under 2001-299 S-3 (33), the Legislature has placed motor carriers regulated by the FDOT, a State Agency, under the regulatory umbrella of the PTC via a special law.

47.       Placement of a motor carrier occupation which is regulated by a State Agency, FDOT, under the regulatory umbrella of a local agency such as the PTC via a special law violates the provisions set forth under Article III, Section 11 ( a ) (20) of the Florida Constitution:

COUNT III

Agency rule 1.15 is an invalid exercise of delegated authority pursuant to

 ch 120.52 (8)( b ) F.S.

48.      Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs one ( 1 ) through forty one (41) above as if set forth fully herein.

49.      2001-299 provides no authority for the PTC to adopt an agency rule defining limousine or any public vehicle and such rule adoption is deemed an invalid exercise of delegated authority in that it exceeds the PTC’s grant of rule making authority.

COUNT IV

Agency rule 1.15 is an invalid exercise of delegated authority pursuant to

 ch 120.52 (8)( c ) F.S.

50.      Plaintiffs re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs one ( 1 ) through forty one (41) above as if set forth fully herein.

51.      Agency rule 1.15 grossly enlarges and modifies the provision of law being implemented and therefore is an invalid exercise of delegated authority.

COUNT V

Agency rule 1.15 is an invalid exercise of delegated authority pursuant to

 ch 120.52 (8)( d ) F.S.

52.      Plaintiffs re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs one ( 1 ) through forty one (41) above as if set forth fully herein.

53.       Agency rule 1.15 vests the PTC with unbridled discretion to determine what vehicles qualify as limousines and therefore is an invalid exercise of delegated authority.

COUNT VI

Agency rule 1.15 is  an invalid exercise of delegated authority pursuant to

 ch 120.52 (8)(f) F.S.

54.      Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs one ( 1 ) through forty one (41) above as if set forth fully herein.

55.      Agency rule 1.15 significantly increases motor vehicle purchase costs which when combined with higher fuel and maintenance cost significantly increases the operating cost for the motor carrier.

56.      Axiomatic that a luxury limousine service commands a higher pricing for the consumer, rule 1.15 significantly increases the transport cost which is borne by the consumer  residing in jurisdictions outside of the jurisdiction of the PTC.     

COUNT VII

Fees set forth under appendix 1 of PTC agency rules are an invalid exercise of delegated authority pursuant to ch 120.52 (8)(b) F.S.

57.      Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs one ( 1 ) through forty one (41) above as if set forth fully herein.

58.      The PTC, authorized to set fees commensurate to services rendered, is using the fees as a device to suppress market entry which contravenes the authority provided for in its enabling legislation.

COUNT VIII

Fees set forth under appendix 1 of PTC agency rules are an invalid exercise of delegated authority pursuant to ch 120.52 (8)(f) F.S.

59.      Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs one ( 1 ) through forty one (41) above as if set forth fully herein.

60.      The exorbitant no-refund application fees and the vehicle permit fees applied to intercounty motor carriers discourages outlying county nonpublic transport offerings to transport hubs in Tampa, creates a monopoly affect, and is not related to any statutory objective of the PTC.

COUNT IX

PTC acts in violation of 2001-299 S-5, (1)(b) L.O.F.

61.      Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs one ( 1 ) through forty one (41) above as if set forth fully herein.

62.      PTC agency rules 1.15 and fees under appendix 1 violates the statutory mandate that the PTC adopt rules in conformance with ch 120 F.S. as provided for under S-5, (1)(b).

COUNT X

Kozak has been deprived of a fundamental liberty right under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution to pursue a livelihood predicated on unconstitutional law

63.       Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs one ( 1 ) through forty one (41) above as if set forth fully herein.

64.       Regulated by the FDOT, a state agency, the inclusion of nonpublic sector buses and subsequent placement under the regulatory control of the PTC via a special law violates the provisions contained under Article III, Section 11 ( a ) (20) of the Florida Constitution.

65.      This unconstitutional inclusion prohibits Kozak from serving his HernandoCounty based customers needs for transport to and from the regional interstate transportation hubs in Tampa unless Kozak is willing to disregard the rights offered and the will of the people contained under the Florida Constitution.

66.      Under threat of enforcement including physical arrest and vehicle seizure, Kozak has suffered business and personal economic damages as a result of his FDOT regulated nonpublic sector bus services being placed under the regulation of the PTC via a special law.

COUNT XI

Kozak has been deprived of a fundamental liberty right under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution to pursue a livelihood predicated on agency rule 1.15 which redefines the statutory definition of limousine

67.      Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs one ( 1 ) through forty one (41) above as if set forth fully herein.

68.       Exceeding its authority as an administrative unit of government with no constitutional powers and in violation of 2001-299’s mandate to adopt rules in conformance with ch 120 F.S., the PTC has adopted agency rule 1.15 which grossly enlarges and modifies the definition of limousine as provided for by the Legislature under 2001-299 S-3, (17) and in doing such, Kozak is barred from applying for a certificate required by 2001-299 in order to facilitate the transport of his Hernando customers to and from the regional interstate hubs in Tampa with his fleet minivan.

69.      Acting under color of law, the PTC deprives Kozak a fundamental liberty to pursue a livelihood protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution solely predicated on the adoption and enforcement of an agency rule which is not in compliance with statutory mandates.   

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

70.   Because the provisions of 2001-299 interferes with Kozak’s right to traverse Hillsborough County while engaged in the occupation of a nonpublic sector bus motor carrier of passengers without fear of harassment, searches, seizures and arrest as alleged herein, Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law and would continue to suffer the irreparable harm of being deprived of the privileges granted under the Florida Constitution as an occupation regulated by a State Agency.

71.     An injunction would not harm the public interest because the public interest favors the free exercise of rights protected by the Florida Constitution whose cited constitutional provisions contained herein are the will of the people and what is being sought is that the PTC, as a public entity, adheres to the Florida Constitution.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE the Plaintiffs respectfully requests that this Honorable Court grants the following relief:

a.   Declare that 2001-299 S-3 (17) inclusion of vehicles operated by motor carriers who are regulated by the FDOT violates Article III, Section 11 (a)(20) of the Florida Constitution and therefore this section is invalid and unenforceable.

b.   Declare that 2001-299 S-3 (33) inclusion of vehicles operated by motor carriers who are regulated by the FDOT violates Article III, Section 11 (a)(20) of the Florida Constitution and therefore this section is invalid and unenforceable.

c.   Declare agency rule 1.15 to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority pursuant to ch 120.52 (8)(b)(c)(d) and (f) Florida Statutes.

d.   Declare agency rule Appendix 1 paragraph 1 and 6 to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority pursuant to ch 120.52 (8)(b) and (f) Florida Statutes.

e.   Find Defendant to be in violation of ch 2001-299 S-5 (1)(b) L.O.F. in the Defendant has failed to adopt agency rules in conformance with the Florida Administrative Procedures Act, Chapter 120 Florida Statutes.

f.   Find that Plaintiff has been deprived of his constitutional right to pursue a  livelihood predicated on unconstitutional law applied to his FDOT regulated nonpublic sector bus occupation.

g.   Find that Plaintiff has been deprived of his constitutional right to pursue a livelihood predicated agency rule 1.15 which exceeds Defendant’s delegated legislative authority.     

h.   Set and hold a hearing, and temporarily and permanently enjoin the Defendant, PTC, from interfering with Kozak’s rights to operate nonpublic sector bus carriage of passengers without fear of harassment, searches, seizures and arrest and issue a mandatory injunction allowing Kozak to engage in the occupation of motor carrier transport of passengers in any vehicle meeting the statutory definition of a nonpublic sector bus.

i.    The awarding of business and personal economic damages resulting from the actions of the Defendant.  

j.   Grant such further relief as this Honorable Court deems appropriate.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

The Plaintiff herein would demand a jury trial on all issues so triable.

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